Skinnerian Neuromythology: Consciousness Explained

What One Will NOT Find in Consciousness Explained:
1) any theses or arguments intended to state the literal truth [1]
2) discrimination between conscious and non-conscious events [2]
3) a satisfactory answer to how physical processes in the brain cause consciousness [8]
4) an empirical theory of consciousness — as Dennett himself somewhat rashly claims [14]
5) an explanation of what it is to adopt the Intentional Stance [35]
6) consciousness explained away [38]
7) attention to the role of emotions
an account of consciousness that considers the autonomic and peripheral nervous
systems, the neuroendocrine system and axis, the endocrine and immune systems
9) an explanation for how the ‘Joycean machine’ ( as stream-of-consciousness virtual
machine) works
10) analysis of noumenon [46]

What One Will Find in Consciousness Explained:

1) a family of metaphors [1]
2) metaphors, which, as a set of tools, have serious design faults [2]
3) Joycean Machine metaphor ( that does not add up to a theory of consciousnes) [2]
4) Probing and narrative-precipitation ( that fail to mark off conscious from nonconscious events) [2]
5) Consciousness ignored [3]
6) An undercutting of the database for the empirical study of CSC by restricting analysis to inputs and to output “texts” (i.e., stimulus and response). Such practices as nearly killed off CSC research earlier in this century. [4]
7) An erroneous assertion that the difference between misremembering(Orwellian) and misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated [5]
Philosophical misuse of an important neuropsychological phenomenon, known as blindsight [6]
9) A hampering of scientific and philosophical understanding of the phenomenon and of consciousness through a misrepresentation of blindsight [6]
10) A mistaken account of visual filling-in (described as results of the brain’s “ignoring an absence” or “jumping to a conclusion”) insofar as it actually comprises a multitude of different perceptual completion phenomena involving spatially propagating neural activity (neural filling-in). [7]
11) Ignorance of the importance of a consideration of qualia to imagery and cognition [9]
12) A failed argument (however true its conclusion) against the Cartesian Screen [10]
13) A use of the concept of phenomenology in almost complete disregard of the work of Husserl and his successors in German and French philosophy [11]
14) A textual relativism that undermines materialism [12]
15) A mistaken belief that qualia, and therefore their causes, can be temporally point- like, but qualia theorists are committed to no such view; and without this commitment, the argument from Orwellian/ Stalinesque indeterminacy does not succeed against qualia [13]
16) a fully naturalized account of consciousness that manages to leave out the very consciousness he purports to explain [15]
17) an argument that Dennet does not need to play the philosopher’s game of saying whether he is a behaviorist, a functionalist, an eliminativist [16]
18) Dennett as a behaviorist, a functionalist, and eliminativist [16]
19) verificationist attacks on qualia that are too radical to carry conviction [17]
20) accounts of pains, dreams, and images that in no case earn the eliminative conclusions of his arguments [20]
21) an equation of reportability with consciousness, which completely leaves out the qualitative content of conscious states [21]
22) an erroneous account of the blindspot and scotomas [22]
23) a Cartesian first-person operationalism [24]
24) fundamental eliminativism about phenomenology [29]
25) arguments that rely on a question-begging third-person absolutism [30]
26) question begging verificationism [31]
27) a failure of representationalism [37]
28) a pervasive neuromythology that is misleading about the scope and limits of science and, hence, a ‘scientism’ that could give science a bad name [40]
29) fundamentalism on the scientific side of the fence [41]
30) a series of strawmen arguments [42]
31) cheap rhetorical shots, shellgames [43]
32) promising title, nowhere fulfilled [44]
33) determination by fiat, which phenomena are to be called conscious “scientifically” followed by failed attempts to explain even them [44]
34) an analysis of phenomena [46]
35) a spiffy, up-to-date methodology of– get this — Skinnerian behaviorism [47]
36) a confounding of two distinct projects through a close interweaving of empirical speculations into how intentional systems are built with a philosophical inquiry into what intentional systems and intentional states are. [49]
37) a Skinnerian polemic which, by a series of slightly questionable steps, the reader is lead to embrace an outrageous conclusion [50]
38) a jumbled mixture of neurophysiology, higher cognitive functions, current experience and brute, all eminently suited to ‘decomposing’ a composite reification of those processes into what the the “thinking thing” is.[51]
39) strawman arguments that undermine Cartesian materialism while carrying no weight against a Phenomenal Realism [52]
40) denial of aspect to experience,the existence of which is both entirely compatible with both functionalism and physicalism; hence, an account of consciousness that, in its attempt to deny same, runs the risk of being seen to eliminate what it purports to explain. [53]

References Cited:

1) McGinn, Colin. Consciousness Evaded: Comments on Dennett, Philosophical Perspectives,
Vol. 9, AI, Connectionism and Philosophical Psychology. (1995), pp. 241-249.

2) `The Best Set of Tools’? Dennett’s Metaphors and the Mind-Body Problem
(in Discussions) Kirk, Robert, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 172. (Jul., 1993), pp.
335-343.

3) Block, Ned. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90, No. 4. (Apr., 1993), pp. 181-193.

4) Dennett, consciousness, and the sorrows of functionalism. Mangan, Bruce, U California, Inst of Cognitive Studies, Berkeley, US

5) Christie J; Barresi J, Department of Psychology, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, Consciousness and cognition, 2002 Jun, 11(2):347-65

6) Blindsight in hindsight, Consciousness and cognition, 1997 Mar, 6(1):67-74

7) Finding out about filling-in: a guide to perceptual completion for visual science and the philosophy of perception.Pessoa L; Thompson E; Noe A; The Behavioral and brain sciences, 1998 Dec, 21(6):723-48; discussion 748-802

What is consciousness? Solms M, Academic Department of Neurosurgery, Royal London Hospital, Whitechapel, England. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 1997, 45(3):681-703; discussion 704-78

9) The importance of a consideration of qualia to imagery and cognition. Hubbard TL, Department of Psychology, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, Conscious Cogn. 1996 Sep;5(3):359-67

10) Dennett’s Misrememberings,Bloomfield,-Paul, Philosophia-. Mr 98; 26(1-2): 207-218

11) Phenomenology and Fiction in Dennett, Carr,-David, International-Journal-of-Philosophical-Studies. O 98; 6(3): 331-344, International-Journal-of-Philosophical-Studies

12) Dennett’s Fictional Selves, Cooney,-Brian, Southwest-Philosophy-Review. Ja 94; 10(1): 117-124

13) Orwell, Stalin, and Determinate Qualia, Robinson,-William-S, Pacific-Philosophical-Quarterly. Je 94; 75(2): 151-164

14) Dennett’s Conceptual Reform, Ross,-Don, Behavior-and-Philosophy. Spr-Sum 94; 22(1): 41-52

15) Minds, Memes, and Rhetoric, Clark,-Stephen-R-L, Inquiry-. Mr 93; 36(1-2): 3-16,Inquiry:-An-Interdisciplinary-Journal-of-Philosophy

16) Appendix A (For Philosophers), Jackson,-Frank, Philosophy-and-Phenomenological-Research. D 93; 53(4): 899-903

17) The Elimination of Experience, Seager,-William, Philosophy-and-Phenomenological-Research. Je 93; 53(2): 345-365

18) Rorty, Richard. “Blunder Around for a While.” London Review of
Books (November 21, 1991), 13(22):3, 5-6.

19) Block, N. 1995. What is Dennett’s theory a theory of? Philosophical
Topics 22:23-40.

20) Bricke, J. 1984. Dennett’s eliminative arguments. Philosophical Studies
45:413-29.

21) Bricke, J. 1985. Consciousness and Dennett’s intentionalist net.
Philosophical Studies 48:249-56.

22) Churchland, P. S. & Ramachandran, V. S. 1993. Filling in: Why Dennett
is wrong. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.

23) Clark, S. R. L. 1993. Minds, memes, and rhetoric. Inquiry 36:3-16.

24) Dretske, F. 1995. Differences that make no difference. Philosophical
Topics 22:41-57.

25) Fellows, R. & O’Hear, A. 1993. Consciousness avoided. Inquiry 36:
73-91.

26) Marbach, E. 1994. Troubles with heterophenomenology. In (R. Casati, B.
Smith, & S. White, eds) Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences.
Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.

27) McCauley, R. N. 1993. Why the blind can’t lead the blind: Dennett on
The blind spot, blindsight, and sensory qualia. Consciousness and Cognition
2:155-64.

28) McGinn, C. 1995. Consciousness evaded: Comments on Dennett.
Philosophical Perspectives 9:241-49.

29) Seager, W. E. 1993. Verification, skepticism, and consciousness.
Inquiry.

30) Siewert, C. 1993. What Dennett can’t imagine and why. Inquiry.

31) Tye, M. 1993. Reflections on Dennett and consciousness. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 53:891-6.

32) Fodor, Jerry. “Deconstructing Dennett’s Darwin.” Mind &
Language (September 1996), 11(3):246-262.

33) McGinn, Colin. “Consciousness Evaded: Comments on Dennett.”
In James E. Tomberlin, ed., AI, Connectionism and Philosophical
Psychology. Philosophical Perspectives, 9. Ridgeview: Atascadero, 1995.

34) Nagel, Thomas. Other Minds: Critical Essays 1969-1994. New
York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Includes “7. Dennett: Content and Consciousness”; “8. Dennett: Consciousness Dissolved.”

35) Slors, Marc. “Why Dennett Cannot Explain What It is to Adopt the Intentional Stance.” Philosophical Quarterly (January 1996), 46(182):93-98.

36) Tye, Michael. “Reflections on Dennett and Consciousness.”Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research (December 1993), 53(4):893-898.

37) Ward, Andrew. “The Failure of Dennett’s Representationalism: A Wittgensteinian Resolution.” Journal of Philosophical Research (1993), 18:285-307.

38) Wuketits, Franz. “Consciousness Explained–or Explained Away?”
Acta Analytica (1994): 55-64.

39) Yu, Paul and Gary Fuller. “A Critique of Dennett.” Synthese (March
1986), 66(3):453-476.

40) Brains and minds: a brief history of neuromythology, R C Tallis, Fitzpatrick Lecture, given at the Royal College of Physicians on 21 July 1999, J R Coll Physicians Lond 2000;34:563-7

41) Bernard Haisch, Freeing the Scientific Imagination, IONS Review #57, Sept. – Nov. 2001

42 –52) Excerpts from informal Reviews at Amazon.com

53) Shoemaker, Sydney, Lovely and Suspect Ideas ,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Dec., 1993), pp. 905-910.

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